MARKETS AND PRIVACY by Laudon, Kenneth C.
MARKETS AND PRIVACY 
P r o f e s s o r  Kenneth C .  L a u d o n  
W o r k i n q  P a p e r  S e r i e s  
STERN IS-93-21 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of  Business 
Working Paper IS-93-21 
Markets and Privacy 
Prof. Kenneth C. Laudon 
Stern School of Business 
Management Education Center 
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-66 
New York, New York 10012 
(914 271-6321) 
Revised Draft Version July 1993 
Filename: PKIV3 
Abstract 
Since the 1960s privacy advocates have relied on regulatory and legislative 
approaches to privacy protection in the Unjted States, Canada and Europe. While 
important progress has been made in certain areas, there are  large gaps and 
significant loopholes in existing legislation. I argue that a market-based approach 
to privacy protection would be far  more effective and efficient in protecting 
individual information than current approaches. 
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Introduction 
The protection of individual information privacy is a widely accepted value in 
democratic societies without which the concept of democracy based on individual 
choice makes little sense. Since the 1960s many societies have developed privacy 
protection laws and replations to guard against unfettered government and private 
industry use of personal information. While these protections conceived in the 
1960s are important first steps in protecting privacy, existing laws and their 
conceptual foundation are outdated due to changes in technology. New concepts 
and methods of privacy protection are needed to address the contemporary and 
near-future technological environment. 
By the year 2000 technological developments are likely to make existing legal 
frameworks for protecting privacy even more outdated than is true today. For 
instance, the proposed National Data Fetwork of the Clinton Administration, and 
the prototype National Research and Education Network (NREN) which is an 
important component of the High-Performance Computing Act (1991), are destined 
to contain a great deal of personal information including medical, genetic, 
insurance, retail purchase, and financial records. While these nenvorks offer socien7 
important benefits like remote diagnosis of disease, lower medical costs, and lower 
financial transaction costs, such networks \vill make it less expensive and much 
easier to engage in privacy invasion on a scale never before possible. Who will or 
should own and control this personal information on future national networks? 
What accounting should be made to individuals for use of their private information 
stored and available on national networks? Who shall be liable for misinformation 
and the injuries which may result? Current laws and conceptual frameworks cannot 
answer these questions. National Data Networks also offer opportunities for 
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developing new concepts and methods of protecting privacy and security in a 
network intensive 21st Century. 
Re-thinking Privacy 
The premise of this paper is that to ensure the protection of privacy beyond 
2000 we should consider market-based mechanisms based upon individual 
ownership of personal information and National Information Markets (NIM) where 
individuals can receive fair compensation for information about themselves. This 
step is necessary because of the continued erosion of privacy brought about by 
technological change, institutional iorces, and the increasingly outdated legal 
foundation of privacy protection. Together these forces have eroded individuals' 
control over the flow of information about themselves. Today, the cost of invading 
privacy is far lower than the true social cost. I believe it is possible to strengthen 
individual control over personal information and to strengthen (not replace) the 
existing legal foundations of privacy by permitting markets to work. In the end. 
there should be  as much prik'acy as people are willing to pay for, and as much use of 
private personal information for commercial purposes as is socially efficient. 
Part  1 Privacy: The Current Situation 
Privacy is the moral claim of individuals to be left alone and to control the 
flow of information about themselves. (1) (Warren and Brandeis 1890; Westin 196'7; 
Laudon 1986; Flaherty 1989: Bennett 1992; Gavison 1980). Privacy is also a social 
value stated in important documents, and a political statement reflected in laws. 
There is also a behavioral reality of privacy, the day-to-day routine practices for 
handling personal information. The behavioral reality of privacy stands apart from 
the moral claims, political statements, and laws and must be considered separately. 
When individuals claim that information about them (or their own behavior) 
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is private, they generally mean that they do not nlant this information shared with 
others, and/or that they would like to control the dissemination of this information, 
sharing with some (relatives) but not others. These claims of individuals are 
sometimes strongly supported by cultural assumptions which make it odious for 
individuals or organizations to deny these claims ( 2 )  (Warren and Brandeis 1890; 
Westin 1967; Laudon 1986; Flaherty 1989; Bennett 1992; Gavison 1980). 
1.1 Privacy as a Moral Continuum 
Translating these general cultural value statements and individual claims to 
information control into po!itical laws has alxvays been difficult because in all 
societies there are competing claims by government and private organizations 
demanding access to information about individuals in order to promote national 
security, public health. law enforcement, commerce, or other valued social ends. In 
fact privacy is a moral and cultural continuum anchored on one end by absolutist 
claims for complete individilal privacy, and on the other end by totalitarian societies 
where private and State organizations claim the right to obtain any information 
which furthers the purpose of the State (Figure 1). 
F i p r e  I Privacy as a Moral Continuum 
In the middle of this continuum one finds due process claims to privacy, a 
negotiated area which strikes a compromise between organizational claims for 
efficiency and individual claims to  privacy. The til t  of public policy can often be 
discerned by carefully examining what claim is given primacy. In some cases of 
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public policy, individual privacy is foremost unless a compelling state interest can be 
asserted, while in other policies organizational efficiency comes first unless a 
compelling individual interest can be asserted. This distinction becomes important 
below when considering privacy as a legal reality. 
1.2 Privacy in Law 
In the U.S. there are twelve major pieces of Federal legislation specifically 
r ep la t ing  the collection, use, management, and dissemination of personal 
information by the Federal governmeni and private organizations (Fi,we 2). 
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Figure 2 
Federal Privacy Laws in the U.S. 
( I )  Ptivacy Laws Aflecting the Federal Govem~nent 
Freedom of Information Act, 1968 as Amended (5 USC 552) 
Privacy Act of 1974 as Amended ( 5  USC 552a) 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
Computer Security Act of 1987 
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 
Federal Managers Financjal Integrity Act of 1982 
(2) Privacy Laws A ffecting Private lnsritutions 
Fair Credit Reporting Act: 1970 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1978 
Privacy Protection Act of 1980 
/ Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 
The seven major pieces of privacy legislation affecting the federal 
government set forth the due process rules that federal officials must follow when 
dealing with personal information. 'T'he most important contribution of this 
legislation is that it prevents federal officials from rummaging through your bank 
records without a warrant, listening to your electronic conlmunications without a 
warrant. or cutting off benefits simply because of a computer match. The legislation 
also sets forth standards of computer security involving personal financial 
information. The omnibus Privacy Act of 1974 applies to all federal records and 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93-21 
sets forth the rules which the government must follow when managing persona1 
information. The Freedom of Information Act is included here because it severely 
limits federal government ciaims that information it holds is "private" and cannot be 
shared with the public. 
Among the significant limitations of this legislation is that it limits only the 
behavior of federal officials. and then only mildly. Some state and local officials, 
private citizens and organizations may rummage through your bank records or 
eavesdrop on your cellular phone conversations. A second limitation is that federal 
agencies have found loopholes in the law that permit them to widely share personal 
information within the government without your personal informed consent and 
contrary to the original purpose for which the information was gathered. The only 
"absolutist" privacy protection in this legislation is the prohibition in the Privacy Act 
of 1974 against federal officials gathering information on citizens' exercise of their 
First Amendment rights. Perhaps the most important limitation of this legislation is 
that enforcement is left entirely to individuals who must recover damagers in court. 
?'here is no enforcement agency. 
Figure 2 illustrates that private institutions have for the most part been 
exempt from privacy legislation. The only exceptions--and they are important large 
exceptions-- are the credit data, education, cable, and retail video industries where 
citizens are guaranteed at least due process access to their records and some 
protection against dissen~ination of records. For instance, retail video stores are 
prohibited from disclosing video rental records to anyone without a court order or 
your personal consent. 
With these exceptions, for the most part there are no federal laws that offer 
any protection for the \..zst storehouse of personal information gathered by the 
private and public sectors. .Fipre 3 lists some of the major record systems--both 
private and public-- which can be and are accessed by private organizations and 
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individuals. 
Figure 3 
hlajor Record Systems Not Subject to Privacy Protections 
Medical records 
Insurance files 
Credit card retail transactions 
Personnel records 
Rental, real estatg records 
Financial records 
Most state government records, e.g. h40tor vehicle, business records 







An estimated 200 information superbureaus routinely access these basic sysrems: 
collate the information, and then resell i t  to government agencies, privare 
businesses, and individuals (3)(Deveny 1989). Among the records offered for a fee 
are bank balances. rental history, retail purchases. social security earnings, criminal 
records, credit card charges, unlisted phone numbers, recent phone calls, and a host 
of other information services (4)(Rothfeder 1992). Together this information is 
used to develop a "data image" of individuals that is sold to direct marketers, private 
individuals, investigators, and government organizations. There are no laws 
replating super bureaus per se. 
1.3 Behavioral Privacy: Existing Information Markets 
Laws are not always good indicators or predictors of behavior. Speeding is 
against the law, as is software theft, yet millions of adult citizens knowingly violate 
these laws. Likewise with privacy legislation. While the privacy legislation of the 
last 20 years has made an important contribution towards defining privacy, many 
scholars have concluded that the umbrella of privacy protection has failed to keep 
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pace with the growth in computerized records, the laws are more loophole than law, 
and that in actual practice, with some exceptions, there are only a few meaningful 
limitations on the flow of personal information in the United States. Surveys of 
public opinion have documented a growing public concern over the loss of privacy 
and a growing demand for stronger legislation (5)(Equifax 1990; 1992). 
In fact there is already a lively marketplace in the United States for personal 
information. This market is dominated by large institutional gatherers with little 
role currently for individuals to  participate. Personal information is a valuable asset 
to private and governmental institutions who use i t  to reduce their costs of 
operation. 
The existing market for personal information is based on the notion that the 
gathering institution owns the personal information, and that the individuals 
involved have at best "an interest" but not ownership in information about 
themselves. The 400 million credit records maintained by the three largest credit 
agencies, the 600 rnjllion personal records estimated to be  owned by the 200 largest 
superbureaus, and the 5 billion records maintained and often sold by the Federal 
government, not to mention the billions of records maintained and stored by state 
and local governments, all have a real market value which is demonstrated everyday 
in the marketplace. 
The inability of existing privacy legislation to effectively curtail the flow of 
personal information, or  to give individuals a strong sense of control over the flow of 
their own information, reflects a deeper failure to  understand the marketplace in 
information, and a failure to bring economic perspectives to bear on the problem. 
1.4 Re-thinking the Fa i r  Information Practices Regime 
Virtually all American and European privacy is based on a regulatory 
, 
approach or regime called Fair Information Practices (FJP) first set forth in a report 
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written in 1973 by an advisory committee to the Secretary of the DHEW (6)(U.S. 
DHEW 1973). The five fair information principles are: 
1) There shall be no personal record systems whose very existence is secret, 
2) individuals have rights of access, inspection, review, and amendment to systems 
that contain information about them, 
3) There must be a way for individuals to prevent information about themselves 
gathered for one purpose being used for another purpose without their consent, 
4) Organizations and managers of systems are responsible and can be held 
accountable for the damage done by systems, for their reliability and security, and 
5 )  Goverrients have the right to intervene in the information relationships among 
private parties. 
One of the key advances of FIP doctrine is its recognition that individuals have an 
"interest" in records which contain personal information about them even though 
those records are created by third parties. This followed, the report argued, from 
the fact of "mutuality of record generating relationships"--the fact that both parties 
in a transaction have a need for creating and storing records. 
What is the nature of this "interest" and how could individuals and societies 
protect this interest? The Advisory Committee did not recommend a new 
enforcement agency, an Ombudsman, or individual ownership of information. 
lnstead the Committee argued that any privacy laws should be enforced by 
individuals seeking redress in courts of law for damages done by invasion of privacy, 
and by building statutory iricentives for large institutions to comply with the Fair 
information Practices principles above. 
Europe, Canada and many other nations have followed the lead of the 
Committee in defining privacy but often they have chosen to enforce their privacy 
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laws by creating Privacy Commissions or Data Protection Agencies. ( 7 )  (Flaherty 
1979; 1989). Whether or not these nations have "more privacy" is open to question. 
1.5 Technological and lnstitutional Limitations of the Fair Information Practices 
Regime 
There are many problems with the FIP which seriously undermine its 
effectiveness in protecting privacy today. The FIP doctrine was based on the 
technological reality of the 1960s where a small number of very large scale 
mainframe databases operated by the Federal and State governments, or by large 
financial institutions, were the primary threats to privacy. 1n this period it was 
conceivable that an individual could know all the databases in which he or she 
appeared. But today large scale database systems can be operated by PC based 
networks (even individual PCs now rival the size of 1960's mainframe capacities). 
Large scale databases have become so ubiquitous that individuals have no 
possibility of knowing about all the database systems in which they appear. Hence 
the "no secret systems" principle, which originated in an era when only very large 
scale institutions possessed databases, is technologically out of date. 
A cascade of serious problems follows: not knowing about so many systems, 
it  is impossible to gain access, review or correct information in them. It becomes 
in~possible to give "informed consent" for third party use of private information. (8) 
And it becomes in~possible 10 know if managers of systems are holding persona1 
information secure, reliable, and hence difficult to hold managers of these systems 
accountable or liable. 
The FIP regime does not take into account other forces in modern society 
which mitigate against individuals having a social space to think, read, write, 
conspire, and innovate. The FIP does not take into account the systemic nature of 
the problem of information--how much it costs, who i t  costs, and who owns it. The 
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FIP perspective does nor account for harm done to the entire society but focuses 
instead on individual injury. lmagine if we conceptualized and enforced 
environmental laws in this manner, with no federal standards or enforcement. (9 )  
Perhaps the most significant weakness of the FIP regime is its failure to 
specify a stronger form of "interest" that individuals have in their personal 
information. A strong forn: of "interest" would be a property interest rather than a 
mere juridical or administrative interest. We explore this option below. 
Part 2 Finding Conceptual Support For I;'ri~ac;v in Rlieroeconomic Perspectjves 
Due process, individual rights, and 1imi:ations on the power of the State and 
private organizations are all key ingredients in Enlightenment theories of social 
order. These perspectives have preserved what little privacy we have left. But other 
theories of social order have very different conceptions of information and privacy 
which are important to keep in mind when formulating new policies. In these other 
theories, progress depends IJpon the near unfettered exchange of information, and 
the reduction of any barriers to the flow of information. Insofar as these theories 
are reflections of real world forces, none of this bodes well for privacy ( 1 o)(Posner 
1979). 
2.1 When Things Go  Right: Production Function Models of Order 
In a perfect world cl~aracterized by perfect information and perfect 
information systems widely shared by all, capital and labor are combined at their 
most socially efficient levels to produce the wealth of nations. In this 
most felicitous world of 19th Century economic thought, symmetry of information 
among market participanrs (capitalists, laborers, and consumers) is the lubricant of 
social and econon~ic progress. Information also plays a critical role in the 
production process (as opposed to market process) because it is embodied in labor 
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as knowledge and in capital which after all is just a physical instantiation of social 
knowledge and information. Information technology is like any other capital 
investment: presumably cheaper than labor, and more productive, info~mation 
technology replaces labor in the production function, making labor and overall 
production more efficient, and the society wealthier. 
What's wrong with this theory of the firm and markets is of course that it 
bears little resemblance to reality and lacks predictive power. As i t  turns out, 
information is not simmetrically distributed (hence markets don't function as 
predicted) and information technology is not freely substitutable for labor (hence 
productivity in information-based firms does not follow typical patterns). This has 
created an industry and market for new theories based on opposite a:sumptions: the 
asymmetric distribution of information. 
2.2 When Things Go Wrong: Asymmetries in information 
A number of contemporary theories of social order are concerned with 
problems arising from asymmetries in the distribution of information. a more 
realistic view of the real distribution of information. These theories play a large 
role in education and research in contemporary Finance, Microeconomics, 
Accounting, and Management/Organizational Behavior, Agency theory focuses on 
the dilemma of firm owner: (principals) who must hire agents (managers) to run 
their firms (ll)(Jensen and MecMing 1976; Fanla 1980). The firm is a nexus of 
contracts among self interested individuals in which the agents have most of the 
information, and the principals find it very costly or impossible to monitor the real 
behavior of their agents. Firms, and by implication societies, experience agency 
costs as they attempt to build more and more complex monitoring mechanisms. 
Public welfare declines as these investments produce no additional output. 
Information systems appear in agency theory as a convenient low cost monitoring 
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tool which permit firms to grow without increasing agency costs. 
 symmetries in information also drive transaction cost models of social 
order. Why do firms or organizations exist? Rather than hire people, why don't 
firms rely on markets to supply their needs, markets where contractors would 
compete with one another? In transaction cost theory the answer is that in markets 
participants have unequal access to information on the quality of goods and 
providers in the marketplace (12)(\Villiarnson, 1985; 1975). It's costly to participate 
in markets: contracts have ta be written, monitored, goods evaluated, and funds 
recovered for failure. Firixs grow in size as a way of reducing transaction costs. 
Informati'on technology apFears in this theory as a platform for electronic markets 
where information on suppliers and prices, and costs of monitoring compliance with 
contracts, could b e  reduced. This means that firms could rely more on markets, less 
on firm growth in size. I,ikewise, firms could shrink in size (number of employees) 
as they expand business by contracting out vital services. 
Other contemporary theories--adverse selection and moral hazard-- focus on 
market failures caused by asymmetries in information. Market failures are often 
attributed to asymmetries in information. Consider adverse selection (market 
situations where the bad drive out the good) due to asymmetries in information. 
Because insurance companies can never be sure about any individual's health (they 
lack enough detailed information). and because unhealthy people need insurance 
most, the insured pool becomes a collection of unhealthy people forcing insurance 
companies to raise rates. Healthy people drop out--refusing to pay these high rates 
and recognizing they rarely get sick anyway--and soon the insured pool becomes 
uneconomic to insure. 
Or consider moral hazard (so-called because individuals can alter their 
behavior, potentially creating a hazard, once they have paid a premium insuring 
against the consequences of their actions). Because insurance companies cannot 
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monitor how many miles people really drive (information asymmetry), drivers know 
they can drive as many miles as they want once they have paid the insurance 
premium. Drivers assume zny additional accident costs they incur will be  spread 
over a large group and their perceived marginal cost of driving is lower than what in 
fact it actually is. This forces insurance companies to raise rates on all drivers and 
encourages wasteful, accident-increasing driving for all. 
These theories leave the theoretical status of privacy as a desirable social 
goal somewhat ambipous ,  presenting the dilemma of progress vs. privacy. At first 
glance it seems microeconomics is not friendly territory for privacy protection. Rut 
there is some salvation in the notion of externalities. 
2.3 Paying the Price by Finding the Cost: Externalities 
Pigou warned in the 1920s that when manufacturers did not bear the full 
costs of making their goods. when they could "externalize" some costs by making 
others pay, the market price of the goods would be  less than their real costs, leading 
to excess production and resulting social inefficiency. Pigou noted that society 
permitted manufacturers to externalize many costs of production: the health 
damages done to  workers, environmental damages, and loss in aesthetic and other 
non-monetary values. If emissions from a chemical factory destroyed the paint on 
nearby autos, then chemicals were being produced at less than their true social cost, 
and they were selling at a lower price than they would otherwise. 
The remedy to this problem of external cost is to "internalize" the cost: 
impose a tax on the chenlical manufacturer equal to  the size of the externality 
When they are charged for the damage they create, so the theory goes, polluters will 
raise prices (forcing consumers to pay the full cost of their production), shift to non- 
polluting technologies, or  reduce production. 
One problem with this approach is finding the size of the externality. Ideally, 
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one would want to charge 3 tax on polluters lust equal to the external costs. This is 
difficult enough when dealing with tangible externalities, e.g., damages to 
individuals and structures, but is very complicated when aesthetic values are 
involved. How much is a sunny shy worth? What losses in psychological self-worth 
and well being occur because of a polluted physical environment? 
Political problems also arise. Why should we tax: a socially obnoxjous 
behavior, pernu'tting "rich" people and firms to pollute? If the behavior is 
obnoxious, why not outlaw the behavior or closely r e p l a t e  it using standards and 
enforcement through criminal and civil sanctions? 
There are no easy a r ~ s ~ ~ e r s  to these questions. It may be much cheaper to 
permit some small level of obnoxious behavior for those willing to pay rather than 
ban it entirely which would require a huge bureaucratic effort. Enforcing the Clean 
Air Act of  1990 is estimated to cost billions of dollars through the year 2000. force 
uneconomic production technology into general use, and result in an excessively 
high cost-benefit ratio. In contrast, an easy to administer Carbon Tax of $100 a ton 
may accomplish the same overall level of clean air at greatly reduced cost. 
Moreover, each polluter would be able to choose the best, most economic means of 
compliance with the law in order to reduce their taxes. This is far superior to 
bureaucratic dictates that all polluters use the same "approved" technolog.  
2.4 Externalities in an information Econom? 
Given that an efficient information and knowledge-intensive economy 
requires the reduction of information asymmetries where possible within socially 
acceptable limits, can we apply the concept of externalities to achieve a high level of 
privacy protection at a minimal enforcement cost? I think we can if we extend 
some of the thinking from information economics and externalities outlined above. 
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Part  3 B ~ ~ i l d i n g  Information Markets: The Cheapest and Best Protection of Privacy 
May Lie in h4arkets and Taxes-- Not Regulation 
Markets don't just happen. They arise in a context of social, moral, and 
political understandings. Sometimes markets need to be encouraged, monitored, 
created, and regulated by governments. A legitimate and useful role of government 
is to create the conditions for markets to function. 
In the case of informational privacy, markets have either failed to  function 
because of the lack of a legal framework, (i.e. who owns information about a 
transaction), or have been eliminated by collusion among very large market 
participants who benefit from externalities created in the current situation. The 
results of this failure of markets are several. First, the cost of using personal 
information to invade the privacy of individuals is far lower than the true social cost. 
This is because a part of the cost of invading privacy is borne by the individual 
whose privacy is invaded. Other costs ( repla tory  agencies) are created and then 
the government is forced to pay the costs based on general revenue taxes. In 
addition, current government communication and postal replat ions subsidize the 
invasion of privacy by maintaining artificially low prices in key communication 
markets required by privacy invaders. 
Second. as a result, large public and private institutions make far greater use 
of privacy-invading techniq-ues than they otherwise would. Third, this results in a 
decline in public welfare because of the inefficient allocation of tangible resources 
and a decline in individual self confidence and public morale. In the end, we are  
swamped and overwhelmel by activities we do not approve of, are costly and 
obnoxious. We tend to blarne the technology for what in fact is an institutional 
situation we have ourselves created. 
In what sense does privacy invasion impose a cost on individuals whose 
privacy is invaded? There s re  many kinds of costs: direct, indirect, tangible and 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93-21 
intangible costs. Many invasions of privacy in a mass societv occur through the 
secondaq and tertiary uses of information gathered in the conduct of business and 
government. Under current law, individuals largely lose control over information 
gathered about them in the course of legitimate transactions. Once gathered it is 
beyond individual control, and sometimes this is sanctified by very weak "informed 
consent" clauses which themselves are often tied to a particular benefit, e.g., in order 
to receive a public benefit, citizens must agree that the information they give may be 
used for other purposes.(l3) 
Once individuals lose control of information about themselves, and lose any 
ownership in that information. the information is then used freely by other 
institutions to market and communicate with and about individuals. lndividuals 
must cope with this onslaught of comn~unication and incur "coping costs". Figure 4 
highlights some of the different kinds of coping costs. 
Figure 4 
Information Coping Costs ( 1 4 )  
Direct Opening unsolicited mail 
Responding to telephone, e-mail, and other unsolicited 
communication 
Indirect Maintaining excessively large mail and communication 
facilities to  cope with unsolicited mail 
Tangible Loss of productive and leisure time 
Intangible Loss of control over information about oneself; feelings of 
helplessness; feelings of mistrust towards government and 
large private organizations. 
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The solution to this problem is not regulation, or simply the creation of a "Data 
Protection Agency," however helpful this may be, but the creation and 
strengthening of information markets which are more symmetrical in terms of power 
and information. 
3.1 National Information Riarkets (NIMs) 
One possibility is the creation of National Information Markets (NIMs) in 
which information about individuals is bought and sold at a market clearing price. 
Imtitu~ions who gather information about individuals would be allowed to sell 
baskets of information to other institutions willing to pay for it. Each basket would 
contain selected standard information on, say, 1000 persons (name, address, etc.) . 
basic demographics where available, and specialized information, e.g., health, 
financial, occupational, or market information. Different markets might exist for 
different kinds of information, e.g. financial assets, credit data, health, government. 
and general marketing. 
National Info~matjoa Markets would be the only legal avenue for the 
transfer of information about individuals being used for secondary purposes, i.e. for 
purposes and institutions other than those for which the information was originally 
gathered. Hence MasterCard could use information on your credit history for the 
purpose of authorization of future MasterCard purchases, but it could not sell your 
history of credit card purchases directly to other institutions. It could however sell 
this information on a National Information Market where it could be purchased by a 
credit bureau like TRW Credit Data who could then use the information for credit 
histories. 
The National lnfornlation Market is self-supporting: a transfer tax is charged 
and this revenue is used to support the marketplace infrastructure, enforcement of 
rules, and monitoring activities. 
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3.2 National Information Accounts 
A key aspect of a National Information Market is the development of 
National Information Accounts for both suppliers (individuals and institutions) as 
well as purchasers (information brokers. institutions, and individuals). Every citizen 
who chooses to participa~e in the marketplace would be  assigned a National 
Information Account with a unique identifier number and unique bar code symbol. 
The purpose of the NIA is several fold. Personal accounts are required to 
assure that some percentage of the purchase price of information sold on the market 
is returned to individuals as revenue to compensale them for their cost of dealing 
with privacy invasion. Unioue bar codes are r equ i~ed  to control the flow of 
unsolicited mail in the U.S. Postal and private mail systems: no  commercial 
unsolicited mail can flow through private and public post systems without a unjque 
NIA identifier bar code which permits automatic crediting of NIA accounts. 
From a societal point of view it is only through national accounts that 
external costs of an  information-driven economy are properly internalized. From an 
individual point of view, National Accounts restore some measure of real control, 
and the subjective perception of control, and order to the flow of information. 1.5 
The revenue percenrage returned to individual's accounts would have a fixed 
floor and a variable ceiling depending on marker conditions. A fixed floor is 
necessary because the invasion of privacy has some minimal cost. A variable ceiling 
is necessary because individuals should be  able t o  set their own prices for 
participation in the market, including the right not to b e  included and not to b e  the 
object of privacy invasion. An "account blocking" capability is built into the markets' 
computers to prevent illegal buyers of information from participating or  using 
personal information. 
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3.3 Information Fiduciaries 
Because most people would not have the rime or interest to participate 
directly in information markets, information fiduciaries would naturally arise. 
Information fiduciaries are agents acting on your behalf who have assumed certain 
responsibilities under law. Like banks, they would accept deposits of information 
Gom depositors and seek to maximize the return on sales of that information in 
national markets or elsewhere in return for a fee, some percentage of the total 
returns. Such information fiduciaries could easily be recruited from the ranks of 
existing information superagencies and local creditlinformation bureaus. 
3.4 National Information Clearinghouse 
Participants calling an 800 number could find their account balance, and 
perhaps trace the flow of information about themselves, e.g., how did Brown 
Harriman Investment Banking who just contacted me with an unsolicited phone call 
obtain my bank balance information from the Bank of New York? A National 
Information Clearinghouse could empower individuals to trace the flow of 
information about themselves. 
3.5 Government Exemptions 
Would governments have to pay for information that it needs to administer 
programs? In general, no. The concept of National Information Markets applies 
only to secondary and tertiary uses of information for purposes other than those for 
which it was gathered. The information collected by the government in the course 
of conducting business with citizens could be used to administer programs without 
cost. However, if a government sells this information to third parties, or seeks 
information from sources oxtside government programs, then it would be treated as 
simply another market participant and it would pay for information received, and be 
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compensated for information sold. In either event, individual citizens would receive 
some fair percentage of these transactions. Of course, for law enforcement and 
national security purposes, these restrictions may be waived. 
3.6 Objections and  Issues 
There will be many objections to market-based approaches to privacy. 
Privacv advocates will worry that people will be encouraged to "sell" their privacy 
rights; the market may be regressive as wealthy people may charge more for their 
informarion than less well off people; and wealthy institutions willing to pay will be 
able to invade privacy whereas small businesses will not be able to afford privacy 
invasion on such a large scale. Privacy in.rpasion will proceed, albeit at a lower level. 
The credit data, financial service, health, and government agencies who 
benefit from and encourage the failure of information markets would object that 
National Information Markcts are in reality an "information tax." Compensating 
individuals for use of inforn~ation about them would raise the cost of doing public 
and private business transactions, result in less unsolicited market information 
coming to the consumer, potentially creating other market inefficiencies. 
Administering the marketplace, some will a r p e ,  would be  a costly nightmare. 
Defenders of the FIP doctrine will object that a revolution in American property law 
would be required and that it would be impossible from a public policy view to 
create national information markets. 
Let's take the objections of privacy advocates first. Privacy advocates 
typically argue for more rep la t ion ,  more laws, more enforcement agencies, and 
more standards being imposed on everyone. With some notable exceptions, 
described earlier, this approach has not worked. In a market some people will 
indeed sell their privacy in a marketplace, the poor more than the rich, but the price 
offered will likely be  so low as to  not attract many sellers. Rich people may receive 
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much more in the marketplace for the right to invade their privacy, but because they 
are rich most will not care to sell their privacy, and most will charge excessively high 
prices assuring a non-sale, or simply withdraw from the market entirely to preserve 
their privacy completely. 
The  point is that overall p r i~~acy  invasion will decline. there will b e  a net 
increase in privacy because the cost of invading privacy will go up. People will have 
a greater understanding of the flow of information in the society (the markets will 
make it visible), the flow will be more institutionalized and less secret, and they will 
experience more control over the fate of their own information. The concept of a 
market includes the potential to withdraw, to protect ones privacy entirely. 
As advocates of the status quo argue, transaction costs will indeed rise but 
only insofar as to pay for the cost of invading privacy, the externalities of the 
Information Age. National information Markets will indeed impose a "tax" on the 
uses of some kinds of information for some kinds of purposes. The purpose of this 
tax is to discourage the obnoxious use of information which could undermine the 
foundations of a free society if left unchecked. There should not be  any "free lunch" 
when it comes to invading privacy and currently that's just what the information 
industry wants. 
National Information Markets will result in a decline in the use of unsolicited 
communicatjons--a key source of privacy concerns. But i t  will also lead to cost 
savings as firms use the latest technology to target their communications to a 
smaller group, devise new ways to market products and obtain market information, 
and compete with one another on their privacy-regarding corporate practices. 
The cost of administering National Information h4arkets will b e  trivia1 once 
the infrastructure is built. I t  will be self-supporting based on fees charged to market 
participants. As it turns out, information systems are marvelously efficient and 
powerful at keeping accounts and very useful in the creation of electronic markets 
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involving huge transaction volumes at only pennies per transaction. National 
lnformation Markets also open the possibility of detecting quickly large scale 
privacy invasions. ( 16)  
N o  revolution in American property law is required to support national 
information markets. First, property law is quite flexible in recognizing value in a 
wide variety of tangible and intangible assets. including one's personal image. For 
instance, since the turn of the century courts have recognized the claims of 
celebrities to a property interest in their photographic image and the right of 
celebrities to seek compensation whenever their image is used for a commercial 
purpose. What is needed is the extension of a property interest to the digital data 
image of ordinary individuals. 
3.7 National Oversight: A Federal lnformation Commission (FIC) 
We have argued that the principal privacy enforcement mechanism be a 
marketplace rather than a repla tory  agency. Nevertheless, even marketplaces need 
an oversight agency to assure efficiency and standards. The functions of a Federal 
lnformation Commission (FIC) would be  similar to, but go beyond the traditional 
"Data Protection Agency" structured along the European and Canadian lines, and 
more in common with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Functions of the FIC would include: 
"Creating and monitoring National lnformation Markets 
*Conducting system and participant audits 
*Developing data quality standards and expectations 
*Developing privacy, metrics 
*Gathering and publishing statistical reports 
*Conducting educational programs in schools 
*Advising Congress and the Executive on information matters 
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3.8 The Responsibility of IS Professionals 
IS professionals in a democracy are obligated to help individuals and society 
achieve that level of privacy required for the preservation of democracv. IS 
professionals also have obligations to the organizations for whom they work to 
achieve efficiencies in administration which may require the extensive use of 
personal information. These obligations are not necessarily opposed and there are 
several opportunities for professionals to have a positive impact on their resolution. 
First, we should ensure that our professional associations (the ACM, DPMA) 
develop public po!icjes on privacy and clarify the obligations of professionals. 
Second, we should encourage organizations that claim to represent and speak for IS 
professionals in Washington (like CPSR--Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility) to seriously consider new ways to achieve privacy aside from the 
traditional methods of more regulation and more bureaucracy in the form of Data 
I 
Protection Commissions and the like. Third, we should encourage our employers to  
devise policies which do not 
Part  4 Conclusion: Towards Second Generation Privacy Policies 
The  deals cut in the first "regulatory" generation of privacy legislation-- 
segregation of files by function, prohibiting secondary uses of information without 
"informed consent," establishing individual rights, management accountability, and 
due process rules-- were important first steps along the road to civilized 
management of information in a digital age. Nevertheless, technology, economcics, 
and organizational behavior have vitiated the strength of the repla tory  approach. 
There is simply too milch money, political gain, and bureaucratic advantage for the 
r ep la to ry  approach to work by itself. 
If privacy is to be taken seriously as a public value, then the solution is to rely 
on more powerful and less wasteful mechanisms like markets to reduce the level of 
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privacy invasion. As things currently srand, there is much more unsolicited invasion 
of privacy than is tolerable, socially efficient, or politically wise. The current 
situation is costing corporations billions of dollars in sheer u7aste as they pour money 
into privacy-invading marketing and authorization techniques. h4illions of dollars 
worth of junk mail is tossed out without e17en being opened, millions of telephone 
solicitations result in hang-ups, market researchers are refused vital information by 
disgusted and iearful consumers, milljons of faulty credit authorizations are issued 
based on poor data quality, and public cynicism about the information trade is 
growing, all suggesting a polluted, even toxic information environment. A powerful 
way to clean our information environment is through a mixture of market and 
replatory mechanisms. 
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3) Managers and organizations are accountable for the pollution they create 
and can be held liable for any proven damages they do to individuals, 
4) Government has the right to regulate pollution. 
Now imagine the bewilderment of the American public if they were told, "If you 
think you've been harmed by some industrial polluter, you should sue that polluter 
in a Court of law." 
Obviously, placing the burden of proof upon individuals who would have to 
demonstrate actual harm in court, harm which might be irreversible, would destroy 
any possibility for systematically addressing environmental pollution before harm 
was done. The only environmental policy would be correction of past catastrophes. 
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protect privacy in the 21st Century. 
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13. We have avoided the knotty question of who owns information about a 
transaction. For instance, does an individual credit card holder retain some 
ownership or tangible interest in records about his (her) credit card transactions? 
Focusing on "costs" allows us to sidestep this issue temporarily. Ownership interests 
returns as an issue when we.discuss "cost compensation" or who receives the revenue 
from privacy invasion. 
14. Direct costs are those that can be attributed to a specific activity, division, or 
product. Indirect costs are those which cannot be so attributed and are usually 
allocated arbitrarily. Tangible costs (benefits) are those which are palpable and can 
be easily quantified. Intangible costs (benefits) are those which cannot be easily 
quantified. 
15. The revenue percentage returned to individual's accounts would have a fixed 
floor and a variable ceiling ,depending on market conditions. A fired floor because 
the invasion of privacy has some minimal cost. A variable ceiling because 
individuals would be able to set their own prices for participation in the market, 
including the right not to be included and not to be the object of privacy invasion. 
An "account blocking" capability is built into the markets' computers. 
16. Some possibilities here are to encourage private industry to manufacture devices 
to protect personal privacy--technological data security. Congress should discourage 
efforts by public agencies like the FBI to deny individuals the right to technological 
data security. For instance, the argument of the FBI and other security agencies 
that new digital services be built in such a way as to make "wiretapping" feasible, 
and that firms should be prohibited from marketing products that encode digital 
communications, is simply ludicrous. Privacy is a precious commodity, the more so 
when criminal conspiracy is afoot. The technological means for scrambling digital 
transmissions is sufficiently wide-spread and powerful as to make its prohibition 
through a "Digital Volstead Act" meaningless. Worse, a new market could be called 
forth to distribute precisely those products the FBI fears most. 
In addition, privacy invaders can be quickly detected and punished. Inevita 
bly there will be attempts to circumvent National Information Markets by using 
information gathered from a black market. Firms that attempt this and get caught 
can be  locked out of the marketplace for a period of time, and they can be 
prohibited from using postal and telecommunication systems all of which would 
require a code to initiate communications. The postal system and 
telecommunications systems then become crucial enforcement mechanisms. 
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